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ARBITRATION OF AN ORDINARY CIVIL
CLAIM IN FLORIDA
PHILIP K. YONGE

When amicable settlement of a civil claim is impossible, whether
it be a claim for a bent fender or one arising from the faulty construction of an office building, arbitration is a possible alternative
to litigation. As a device for the determination of civil disputes arbitration lies between voluntary settlement and litigation. It partakes
of the nature of settlement in that the parties must voluntarily agree
to the submission to arbitration and in that the dispute is adjusted out
of court; but it resembles litigation in that the decision of the matter
in dispute is made by an agency independent of the parties, that is,
by the arbitrators."
The use of arbitration may be mutually advantageous to the parties
for a number of reasons. It may be quicker,2 or cheaper; the privacy
it allows may be important to the parties; its appeal may lie in the
mere fact that it allows them to adjust their differences out of court;
they may prefer that a particular type of controversy be decided by
persons of their own choosing, such as businessmen expert in the field,
rather than by a judge or jury; or they may wish to deviate from the

'In one respect arbitration can be more far-reaching than settlement: whereas
complete settlement of a claim can be made only after the dispute arises, the
parties may, before a dispute arises, agree to submit any future disputes to arbitration. An agreement to arbitrate future disputes is under Florida law revocable
and unenforceable, however; see chart, p. 159 infra, and accompanying comments.
Contrast settlement of the amount of damages by agreement upon liquidated
damages entered into before a claim arises.
2In an advertisement appearing in The New York Times, Dec. 8, 1952, the
America Fore Insurance Group stated that personal injury cases were subject to
a delay of three years or more in coming to trial in New York City and offered
to arbitrate all personal injury cases arising from automobile accidents against its
policy holders in that city.

[157]
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traditional decision-making process provided by the courts for other
reasons. In the usual, unrestricted arbitration, although the arbitrators are bound by certain basic principles safeguarding the rights
of the parties, they are largely free to disregard substantive and procedural rules of law in reaching their decision. Arbitration finds its
greatest usefulness, therefore, in situations in which the parties are
willing to forego the application of the rules and procedures of law.
It is not the purpose of this article to compare arbitration and
litigation or further to discuss situations in which arbitration may be
advantageous. The decision as to whether arbitration is useful in
any given situation requires, primarily, a knowledge of its workings;
this article seeks to explain the essential requirements of the arbitration procedures available in Florida.
I. CLASSES AND DISABLING FEATURES OF FLORIDA ARBITRATION*

Before considering these procedures a brief discussion will be
undertaken of the classes of arbitrations and of the occasionally troublesome and disabling features of much of arbitration, namely, its
revocability and unenforceability. The following comments and
accompanying chart attempt to explain these matters. Of course such
over-simplification cannot make these frequently illogical matters
entirely clear and may give rise to some misunderstanding. But, since
the purpose of the explanation here is merely to provide orientation
for the ensuing procedural discussion, such purpose can, it is hoped,
be accomplished in this fashion.
Items a through e of the succeeding comments and the similarly
lettered items of the chart concern the classes of arbitration and the
kinds of subject matter dealt with in each class. Items f through q
concern revocability - the right of a party to withdraw from an arbitration - and enforceability - the power of a party to force a recalcitrant opponent to proceed with arbitration. When neither party
seeks to revoke the arbitration and both willingly proceed with it,
problems of revocability and enforceability do not exist; therefore an
understanding of these problems, dealt with in items f through q, is not
essential to an understanding of the discussion of arbitration procedure
that follows. The procedural discussion assumes no desire by either
party to withdraw from or to refuse to proceed with the arbitration.
*A table of heading and subheadings is appended at the end of this article.
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FLORIDA ARBITRATION
Classification; Revocabiity; Enforceability
Agreement to Ar- Agreement to
bitrate Disputes Arbitrate ExistArising in Future ing Disputes
Type

Irrevo- Enforce- Irrevo- Enforce- Irrevo- Enforcecable?
able?
cable?
able?
cable?
able?

Subject Matter

Nonjusticiable
Common law controversies'
arbitration"
Statutory
arbitrationb

NO (?)I NO (?)l NO (?)'

Justiciable
controversies'

NOt

Justiciable
controversies'

Justiciable
"Appraisals"° controversies
as to value,
damage, etc.

Award rendered by the
Arbitrators

NO

g

NOk

NO"

YES*

In some
casesP

t

NO (?) YES'
NO'

In some
cases'

YESt

YESh

In some
YES (?)' cases'

YES-

YES"

In some
casesP

YESq

YES7

NO

YES*

I

1. Types of Arbitration
a. Common Law Arbitration. Arbitration existed at common law;
and, by provision of the Florida arbitration statute, common law procedure may be used as an alternative to the procedure set out in the
statute.3 The parties to the arbitration adopt one or the other of the
two procedures simply by complying with the requirements of the
procedure of their choice. The latter portion of this article is a comparative consideration of these two procedures.
b. Statutory Arbitration. The Florida arbitration statute is Chapter
57 of Florida Statutes 1951. It was originally enacted by the Legislative
Council of the Territory of Florida in 1828. 4 Arbitration under the
3The final paragraph of FLA. STAT. §57.01, "However, any party to a submission
not made a rule of court may seek relief in the courts," was so interpreted by the
Florida Supreme Court in Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Gulf Breeze Cottages, 38 So.2d 828
(Fla. 1949).
4The statute stands as originally enacted except that slight changes in substance have been made in the provisions now appearing as §§57.01, 57.02, and
insignificant changes in wording and in the arrangement of sections have been
made throughout.
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statute is frequently called arbitration "by rule of court" because of
the provision of the statute requiring that the arbitration agreement
be made a rule of court.
c. "Appraisals." Certain matters that would otherwise be classified
as arbitrations must be distinguished from true arbitrations because
of the different treatment that they are in some respects accorded by
the law. 5 Efforts to define the distinction between true arbitrations
and what for lack of better title are here called "appraisals" have not
been successful; 6 and perhaps the clearest way to indicate what is
5The principal differences relate to revocability of the agreement to arbitrate or
"appraise" (see chart, p. 159 supra, and accompanying comments), and at times
to the right of the parties to be heard by the arbitrators or "appraisers" (see pp.
174, 175 infra).

6Some of the opinions distinguish appraisals from true arbitrations on the
basis that appraisals encompass only a portion of a controversy while true arbitration covers all of it. Thus in Steinhardt v. Consolidated Gro. Co., 80 Fla. 531,
533, 86 So. 431 (1920), the Court, holding that the agreement pleaded was a true
arbitration and that the plea asserting it was therefore bad in that true arbitrations
are revocable and cannot be pleaded as a bar to an action, said: "The... plea ...
averred that the parties had agreed to settle by arbitration 'any differences' arising
from the transaction . . .. The plea was bad because 'any differences' is a term
broad enough to include a difference arising upon the question of right to maintain an action for breach of the contract." In Cassara v. Wofford, 55 So.2d 102, 107
(Fla. 1951), the Court said of an agreement authorizing certain persons to decide
whether items were properly deductible from a deposit and to determine compliance with a governing equity decree, "These duties under the submission certainly
go beyond a mere appraisal." The Court also said this was possibly true of the
determination of what constituted ordinary wear and tear, but that the taking
of inventory and making of valuations were appraisals. In a second decision in this
case, 62 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1953), based on more complete information as to the facts,
the Court found, at p. 57, that "'the arbitration used in this case is not the usual
type in which the whole dispute is ... submitted to arbitration.., but was simply
a procedure adopted to dispose of particular and specific aspects of a dispute.'"
Other cases, applying an independent test, hold that an agreement provides for
an appraisal when the determination is to be made under it on a given event,
regardless of whether the parties are then in disagreement, and that the agreement is for an arbitration when the determination is to be made only if the parties
are in "genuine dispute." In Citizens Bldg. of West Palm Beach v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 120 F.2d 982, 983 (5th Cir. 1941), the court held that the agreement was
for an arbitration because

".

. . it was provided that the rent should be agreed

upon between the parties, and only in the event of a genuine dispute between them
as to the rental value of the premises would the matter be submitted to arbitrators.
This feature distinguishes this case from that of Florida Yacht Club v. Renfroe,
67 Fla. 154, 64 So. 742, in which case the appraisers were to act, not in the event of
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meant by an appraisal is to set out those types of matters that have
most commonly been held to be appraisals, with the admonition that
because of the confusion in the law on this topic these matters will
not always be so classified. Matters held to be appraisals include: the
determination of the value of property for purposes of sale 7 or rental; s
the determination of the amount of loss or damage for the purpose
of payment under an insurance policy;9 the determination of the
quality or quantity of goods;1° and the certification of the performance
of a contract according to specification.11 This article does not describe
the procedure of appraisals as such, except when it differs notably
from that of arbitration. Generally speaking, however, the procedure
described below for common law arbitration applies to appraisals
12
also, except with regard to the requirement for a hearing.
a dispute about the proper price for the property, but in the event the lessee
decided to exercise his option and purchase the property."
Still other cases hold that the distinction turns on whether the parties intend
that the arbitrators in determining the controversy submitted to them must give
the parties opportunity to present evidence thereon, which requirement is an
essential of arbitrations and would characterize the proceeding as such, or whether
they may make the decision on their own knowledge without a hearing, characterizing the pioceeding as an appraisal. Thus in Florida Yacht Club v. Renfroe,
supra at 745, the Court said: "These persons called arbitrators had no dispute to
arbitrate. They were required by the contract to fix the price of the property and
terms of payment, and there is nothing to show that they were not expected to do
these things from their own personal knowledge of the property and the situation
of the parties. They appear to have been mere appraisers or valuers selected by reason of their personal knowledge of the matters submitted to them; otherwise hearings
and notice to the parties would have been provided for." See Cassara v. Wofford,
supra; SruRES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND A-WARDs §§7-12 (1930).
The treatise by Wesley A Sturges, then professor of law and now dean of Yale
Law School, is the standard work on the subject of commercial arbitrations. No case
citations for common law doctrines, other than decisions of the Florida Supreme
Court, will ordinarily be given in this article. Frequent reference will be made to the
Sturges treatise, in which the common law cases are collected.
7Florida Yacht Club v. Renfroe, 67 Fla. 154, 64 So. 742 (1914).
sCitizens Bldg. of West Palm Beach v. Western Union Tel. Co., 120 F.2d 982 (5th
Cir. 1941).
9Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 28 Fla. 209, 10 So. 297 (1891).
'oCassara v. Wofford, 55 So.2d 102 (Fla. 1951); Finegan v. L'Engle, 8 Fla. 413
(1859); cf. Steinhardt v. Consolidated Gro. Co., 80 Fla. 531, 86 So. 431 (1920).
"Summeilin v. Thompson, 31 Fla. 369, 12 So. 667 (1893); Wilcox v. Stephenson,
30 Fla. 377, 11 So. 659 (1892); Howard v. Pensacola & A.R.R., 24 Fla. 560, 5 So.

356 (1888); Finegan v. L'Engle, supra note 10.

'2-See

STURGES, Com?,irs.c
C

ARBrrRATiONs AND AwARDs
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2. Subject Matter of Arbitration
d. Common Law Arbitration. By the common law parties may
agree to submit to arbitration all matters that can be made the subject
of a contract.' 3 These include all justiciable and such nonjusticiable
matters as are not illegal or otherwise forbidden as the subject of a
contract. The most important nonjusticiable matters frequently made
the subject of arbitration agreements are labor-industry controversies.
It is true that many of these controversies may be the subject of a
common law or equity suit; but others, such as controversies over
future wages, cannot. Such arbitrations, sometimes called "economic"
arbitrations as distinguished from "judicial" arbitrations, may involve
the making of collective bargaining agreements and may be of great
importance in the adjustment of labor-industry differences. Although,
as is indicated by its title, this article deals primarily with arbitration
of justiciable matters, the common law arbitration procedure described
below is as applicable to nonjusticiable labor-industry disputes as to
justiciable matters.
e. Statutory Arbitration. The Florida arbitration statute is not
by its terms limited to justiciable matters; but it does provide that
the arbitration agreement must be filed "in the court which would have
jurisdiction of the controversy if it were not submitted to arbitration,' 14 and hence clearly seems to contemplate only an arbitration
that might be made the subject of an action in a Florida law or equity
court. 15 The statute contains a suggestion that it is intended to cover
nonjusticiable controversies as well, and general statements by the
commentators lend some support to this view;' 8 but it is submitted
131d. §§60-65.
14FLA. STAT.

§57.02 (1951).

'sSec. 57.01 also contains an implication that the subject matter of a statutory
arbitration must be such that suit might be brought upon it.
16Sec. 57.01 is to the effect that any controversy before or after suit thereon
may be made a statutory arbitration; the qualification quoted in the text follows
in the succeeding section. Crandall, in Practice in Actions at Law in the Circuit
Courts and Supreme Court of Florida §237 (1928), says, "Aside from [crimes and
illegal claims], any claim or disputed matter may be submitted"; and in §240(b)
he says that 9 & 10 WM. III, c. 15, §1, which the Florida Legislature "re-enacted,"
provided that "any controversy, suit or quarrel" may be submitted. Actually this
English statute provided for the submission of "any Controversy, Suit or Quarrel,
Controversies, Suits or Quarrels, for which there is no other Remedy but by
personal Action or Suit in Equity" (italics supplied). STURGES, op. cit. supra note
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that the language quoted above dearly limits the statute to justiciable
controversies.
3. Revocability and Enforceability
f. Common Law Arbitration- Justiciable Controversy - Revocability. By common law doctrine, which has been recognized by the
Florida Supreme Court, parties are unable to make an irrevocable
agreement to arbitrate either future 17 or existing' s controversies. Such
an agreement is said to be contrary to public policy and obnoxious to
the law in that it ousts the jurisdiction of the courts.19 If, however,
neither party revokes the agreement prior to the rendition of an award,
20
the award is irrevocable.
g. Common Law Arbitration- Justiciable Controversy - Enforceability Prior to Award. Since either party may revoke a common law
12, §60, lists Florida among the states allowing any controversy to be submitted
to statutory arbitration. It should be noted that neither of these commentators
expressly states that the statute allows submission of nonjusticiable controversies.
There is no reported Florida decision on the point. The original provision of the
Florida statute, which was enacted in 1828 and was replaced by the present §57.01
in 1892, allows submission of ". . . any matter of difference, controversy or quarrel,
in which action at law or equity may lie .... " (Italics supplied).
'1Steinhardt v. Consolidated Gro. Co., 80 Fla. 531, 86 So. 431 (1920); see
CRANDALL, Op cit. supra note 16, §§237, 239; STURGFS, op. cit. infra note 18,
§§15-17, 19.
1SSTuRGFS, COMMERCIAL ARBrTRATIONS AND AwARDs §76 (1930).
2OMr. Justice Cardozo said of this rule, In re Berkovitz v. Arbib g- Houlberg,
Inc., 230 N.Y. 261, 276, 130 N.E. 288, 292 (1921): "The ancient rule, with its
exceptions and refinements, was criticized by many judges as anomalous and unjust
....
It was followed with frequent protest, in deference to early precedents. Its
hold even upon the common law was hesitating and feeble ....
The judges might
have changed the rule themselves if they had abandoned some early precedents,
as at times they seemed inclined to do. They might have whittled it down to
nothing, as was done indeed in England ....
No one would have suspected that
in so doing they were undermining a jurisdiction which the Constitution had
charged them with a duty to preserve." Cf. Myers v. Jenkins, Adm'r, 63 Ohio St.
101, 120, 57 N.E. 1089, 1093 (1900): "But a party cannot bind himself by contract
in advance to renounce his right to appeal to the courts for the redress of wrongs
....
If this could be done an association might be formed . . . which would renounce our constitution and laws . . . and would most likely become dissatisfied
and disorderly, resulting in riot and bloodshed."
2
OCitizens Bldg. of West Palm Beach v. Western Union Tel. Co., 120 F.2d 982
(5th Cir. 1941); see CRANDALL, op. cit. supra note 16, §239; STuRGES, op. cit. supra
note 18, §18.
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arbitration agreement at any time prior to rendition of the award,
the agreement will not bar an action brought on the matter agreed
to be arbitrated. 21 And a court of equity will not decree specific
performance of the agreement. 22 An action for damages, however,
will apparently lie for the breach of an agreement to submit future
or existing controversies to arbitration, 2 as it is not so obnoxious
as to allow a party to breach it with impunity.
h. Common Law Arbitration- Justiciable Controversy - Enforceability after Award. Common law awards are enforceable by instituting a law or equity action thereon or by being set up as a bar to an
action brought on the subject matter of the arbitration. This topic
4
is dealt with more fully hereafter.2
i. Common Law Arbitration- Nonjusticiable Controversy- Enforceability, Prior to Award, and Revocability. Since an agreement
for the arbitration of a nonjusticiable controversy does not oust the
jurisdiction of the courts, the reason generally given for the revocability of common law arbitration agreements25 logically should not
apply to these agreements; but those jurisdictions that have passed on
the matter, among which Florida is not included, have held that the
ordinary common law rules regarding revocability and enforceability
26
do apply.

j. Common Law Arbitration- Nonjusticiable Controversy-Enforceability after Award. Since the only way to enforce a common law
award is to file a law or equity action thereon, its enforceability is
limited by the extent of the traditional jurisdiction of the law and
equity courts. For example, an action at law for wages earned can
be brought on the wage figure set by an arbitration award, even
though the wage award was entered in a nonjusticiable controversy;
21Steinha-dt v. Consolidated Gro. Co., supra note 17; STURGES, op. cit. supra note

18, §§15, 75, 79.
2

2CpRANDALL,

op. cit. supra note 16, §239;

STURGES,

op. cit. supra note 18,

§§23,
27.
2

3CRANDALL,
Op. cit. supra note 16, §239; STURGES, op. cit. supra note 18,
§§22,
84, 85, 186.
2
4See Part VI, 1, infra.
25See ff supra.
26Gates v. Arizona Brewing Co., 54 Ariz. 266, 95 P.2d 49 (1939); Sanford v.
Boston Edison Co., 316 Mass. 631, 56 N.E.2d 1 (1944); Latter v. Holsum Bread Co.,

108 Utah 364, 160 P.2d 421 (1945).
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but an award formulating the provisions of a contract of employment
will be specifically enforced, as against an employee refusing to work
or otherwise to comply with the award, only to the extent of the power
of the equity court to order specific performance.
k. Statutory Arbitration- Agreement to Arbitrate Future Disputes
Revocability and Enforceability. Although the naked language of
the Florida statute might conceivably be construed to cover future
controversies, its intent is dearly not to do so. The first statute enacted
for the purpose of permitting parties to make irrevocable agreements
to arbitrate future disputes was passed in New York in 1920, nearly
27
a century after the original enactment of the present Florida statute.
No suggestion that the statute does apply to any but existing contro28
versies has been discovered.
-

1. Statutory Arbitration-Agreement
to Arbitrate Existing Disputes - Revocability and Enforceability Priorto Award. The Florida
statute does not by its terms make irrevocable or enforceable an arbitration agreement that has been made a rule of court under the statute.
Most American courts passing on the question have held that such an
arbitration is irrevocable but that the court in which it is a rule may
upon a showing of good cause allow revocation. 29 Other courts have
held that the common law right to revoke remains, notwithstanding
that the arbitration has been made a rule of court, although the revoking party is guilty of contempt of court.30 The Florida Supreme
Court has not passed on this problem.
Questions as to the enforceability of an arbitration made a rule of
court, either by setting the arbitration up as a bar in another action
27N.Y. Axaxr. LAW §275; see STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AwARDs

§26 (1930).
2SSee

CRANDALL,

PRAcrICE

IN

AcTiONS

AT LAw

IN

THE

CmcunT

COURTS AND

(1928).
2In Cassara v. Wofford, 55 So.2d 102 (Fla. 1951), before award was rendered
appellant filed with the court that had made the arbitration a rule a motion entitled "Revocation of Agreement for Arbitration," in which he asked the court to
set aside the rule of court. This motion was denied. The report does not show
SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA §257

whether this denial was assigned as error, and the opinion makes no mention of
the matter. It does, however, in reversing on other grounds the judgment entered
on the award, treat the arbitration agreement as alive. See Notes, 43 L.R.A. (N s.)

711 (1913); 47 L.R.A. (N.s.) 436 (1914).
3OCherry v. Smith, 51 Ga. 558 (1873); see Notes, 43 L.R.A. (N.s.) 711 (1915);
47 L.R.A. (N.s.) 436 (1914).
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brought on the subject matter of the arbitration or by order of the
court compelling the arbitration to proceed, must be left largely unanswered; but some attempt at answer is made below.3' A party breaching his agreement to arbitrate or violating the rule of the court, however, can apparently be held liable for damage for the breach or can
be punished for contempt of court.32 The question of enforceability
under these circumstances will usually be unimportant, since any
unrevoked arbitration can ordinarily proceed ex parte, even though
one party refuses to participate in it.33
m. Statutory Arbitration- Revocability after Award. As previously
noted,34 even by common law doctrine an award once rendered is
irrevocable. The Florida statutory award is likewise irrevocable. 35
n. Statutory Arbitration- Enforceability after Award. A statutory
award, when recorded in the court in which the arbitration is a rule,
has the effect of a judgment or decree of the court. It may be set up
as a bar in an action on the subject matter of the arbitration. These
matters are dealt with more fully in the discussion below.30
o. Appraisals-Revocability Prior to Award. The irrevocability
of an appraisal agreement is recognized by the common law and by
3lAssuming that the agreement is irrevocable, it could probably be set up as

a bar in another action by one of the parties; and perhaps the court in which the
agreement had been made a rule would, if a party to the agreement refused to
proceed with the arbitration, order him to do so in the exercise of its powers to
punish for contempt; see Notes, L.R.A., supra note 30. If the agreement is revocable it probably cannot be set up as a bar to another action on the subject matter

of the agreement; and whether the Court would order a recalcitrant party to
,proceed with arbitration is uncertain.
32
33

See notes 23, 30 supra.

Once a statutory arbitration agreement, as distinct from one at common law,
has been made there is little, if anything, that a recalcitrant party can do to prevent the other party or the arbitrators from proceeding to an award, because the
arbitrators must by statute be appointed in the arbitration agreement, FLA. STAT.
§57.02 (1951). It has been held that, even if one party causes an arbitrator to
withdraw, a valid award may nevertheless be rendered by the remaining arbitrators if a majority of the total number of arbitrators agree to it, Cassara v.
Wofford, 55 So.2d 102 (Fla. 1951). See notes 47-50 infra.
3

4See Jf supra.

3

5F. A. SrAT. §57.07 (1951); Cassara v. Wofford, supra note 33; Payne v. McElya,
90 Fla. 900, 107 So. 241 (1925).
36See Part VI, I infra.
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the Florida Supreme Court with respect to agreements to submit both
present and future disputes. 37 This factor is one of the chief reasons
for drawing the distinction between an appraisal and a true arbitration.
p. Appraisals- Enforceability Prior to Award. Since an appraisal
agreement is irrevocable, it can be set up as a bar to an action brought
on the subject matter of the agreement. 38 But an equity court will not
specifically enforce the agreement if one party refuses to proceed with
the appraisal.3 9
q. Appraisals -Revocability and Enforceability after Award. An
appraisal award is irrevocable and can be pleaded and proved as a
binding adjudication in any suit involving the matter determined by
it.40
4. Inadequacies of FloridaArbitration Statute
In summary, on the assumption that it is desirable to permit
parties to make agreements by which they may bind themselves to
arbitration when they believe it to be to their mutual advantage, the
above comments and chart demonstrate that the Florida arbitration
statute is inadequate in the following respects:
(1) It does not include nonjusticiable controversies.
(2) It does not include agreements to arbitrate future disputes.
(3) It does not provide effective machinery for the enforcement
of either arbitration or appraisal agreements.
The arbitration bill which was introduced in the 1953 session of the
Florida Legislature, but which failed to become law, would have
remedied these inadequacies.
37Finegan v. L'Engle, 8 Fla. 413 (1859); Florida Yacht Club v. Renfroe, 67 Fla.
154, 64 So. 742 (1914); Summerlin v. Thompson, 31 Fla. 369, 12 So. 667 (1893);
Wilcox v. Stephenson, 30 Fla. 377, 11 So. 659 (1892); Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v.
Lewis, 28 Fla. 209, 10 So. 297 (1891); Howard v. Pensacola & A.R.R., 24 Fla. 560,
5 So. 356 (1888); STURGES, op. cit. infra note 39, §§20, 21.
3sFinegan v. L'Engle, supra note 37; Wilcox v. Stephenson, supra note 37;
Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Lewis, supra note 37; see Summerlin v. Thompson, supra

note 37, at 672.
COasaMERCAL ARBITRATIONS AND Aw ARDs §25 (1930).
40Florida Yacht Club v. Renfroe, supra note 37; Wilcox v. Stephenson, supra
note 37; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Lewis, supra note 37; Howard v. Pensacola &
A.R.R., supra note 37.
39STURGES,
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II. THE AGREEMENT TO AB uRAT

The arbitration agreements dealt with in this article concern only
those controversies existing at the time the agreement to submit to
arbitration is made. Agreements to submit future disputes to arbitration are under Florida law revocable by either party.4 ' They are
therefore not an important part of Florida arbitration procedure and
are not dealt with here.
It is the agreement of parties to arbitrate matters in dispute between them that provides the arbitrators with authority to decide the
controversy and gives binding force to their award. This source of
authority for arbitration is neither more nor less than a contract
between the parties, and to be valid it must comply with the ordinary
requirements of the law of contract, 2 including those dealing with
legality of subject matter,43 competence of parties,4 4 and the Stat45
ute of Frauds.
1. Basic Provisions
Primarily, of course, the agreement must contain appropriate words
of agreement. 46 It must also select or provide for the selection of
arbitrators or a single arbitrator and must specify the dispute or
disputes to be decided.
In common law arbitration the agreement may provide a method

for the selection of the arbitrators, 4 7 or may name certain of them
4lSee flf supra. An agreement to submit future disputes to arbitration can, if
unrevoked, provide the basis for a common law award rendered pursuant thereto
just as effectively as an agreement for common law arbitration made after the
controversy has come into being, STuRGEs, op. cit. supra note 39, §141. The legal

requirements of the common law agreement, whether as to future or present dis.
putes, are the same. As to whether a new agreement, after the dispute has come
into being, is necessary to submit a controversy between parties to a future disputes
agreement, see STURGEs, id §141. Of course an agreement to submit future disputes
under an appraisal agreement is irrevocable; see flo supra.
42STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AwARDs §68 (1930).
43Cf. Treadway v. Terrell, 117 Fla. -838, 158 So. 512 (1935); see CRANDALL, OP.
cit. supra note 28, §237; STURGEs, op. cit. supra note 42, §§60-65.
44
CRANDALL, op cit. supra note 28, §236; STURGEs, op. cit. supra note 42, §§48-51.
4
SCRANDALL, op. cit. supra note 28, §237; STURGES, op. cit. supra note 42, §§70, 71.

46
E.g., "We, the undersigned parties, hereby agree to submit to arbitration the
following controversy."

47As to problems relating to arbitrators generally see CRANDALL, op. cit. supra
note 28, §241; STuRGEs, op. cit. supra note 42, c. 8.
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and provide for the selection of the others, 48 or may name all of the
arbitrators. The parties can name or provide for the selection of a
single arbitrator or as many arbitrators as they wish. A statutory arbitration agreement, on the other hand, must name all of the arbitrators.49 The statute seems to contemplate that an odd number of arbitrators is to be named in a statutory arbitration, but the meaning is
not entirely clear . 0
The agreement should be clear and certain in specifying the controversy or controversies to be decided, because basically the authorization that it sets forth controls the scope of the investigation of the
arbitrators and the validity of their award. 5'
2. Technical Provisions
Logically, the mere agreement to submit a controversy to arbitration
should bind the parties to abide by the award rendered pursuant to
the agreement.52 Some jurisdictions, however, have held that the
mere agreement to submit does not so bind them; 53 and until the
Florida Court rules unnecessary any further provision the careful
draftsman will include in every arbitration agreement clauses by
which the parties promise to abide by and comply with the terms of
the award and agree that it shall be final and binding on them.
48A common method is for each of the two contracting parties to name one
arbitrator and to direct them to select a third.
49FLA. STAT. §57.02 (1951). Although in some circumstances an "umpire" is
to be distinguished from an "arbitrator," STURGES, op. cit. supra note 42, §144, for
the purposes of this statute he should be considered simply as an additional arbitrator. That the Legislature intended this result is apparent from the provisions
that appoint him, FLA. STAT. §57.02 (1951), empower him to render awards, §57.05,
and treat him for other purposes exactly like an arbitrator, §§57.04, 57.07. CRANDALL,
op. cit. supra note 28, §242, is in accord with this interpretation of the legislative
intent. Elsewhere in this article, therefore, the term "arbitrator" alone will be used.
50FLA. STAT. §57.02 (1951) provides for the naming of the arbitrator or arbitrators and an umpire. Cf. CRANDALL, op. cit. supra note 28, §242. Certainly an
odd number is desirable in view of the provision for a majority award, FLA. STAT.
§57.05 (1951).
51As to the relative range of subject matter permitted in common law and
statutory arbitrations, see fd and {e supra. Limits on the enforceability of a
common law award should also be noted, jfi supra. There is, of course, no objection to an agreement submitting all disputes between the parties, STURGES, op. cit.
supra note 42, §§74, 75. See also CRANDALL, op. cit. supra note 28, §240 (Supp.).

52SrTUGES, COMMERcrAL ARBrr AToNS AND

AwARws §73 (1930).

5S1bid.
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The Florida arbitration statute specifies that a statutory arbitration "may be made a rule of court by the parties [sic] filing in the
court... a statement... of the agreement ... "54 as is more fully explained below.5 5 There is no express requirement that the parties
agree to make the arbitration a rule of court; accordingly it is submitted that their joint filing of their agreement complies with the
language of the statute. Proof of joint filing might be difficult, however; and simpler and sounder practice dictates that agreements to
submit to statutory arbitration should include promises to file the
agreement in the appropriate court and to make the arbitration a
rule of the court. 56
3. Optional Provisions
An arbitration agreement containing the basic provisions and
technical recitals discussed above is sufficient foundation for a valid
award. No additional provisions need be included in the agreement.
The arbitration under such an agreement is unrestricted; and the
arbitrators are authorized to conduct the investigation in such manner
as they see fit - subject to certain minimum requirements safeguarding
the rights of the parties 57 - and to determine the controversy submitted
to them in accordance with their own ideas of justice, applying only
those rules of law, if any, as they see fit,5 - subject, again, to certain
minimum requirements of fairness. 59 The parties are at liberty, in
both common law and statutory arbitrations, however, to restrict and
control the otherwise general agreement by the inclusion of a great
variety of additional provisions for the purpose of regulating the conduct of the arbitration and the decision of the arbitrators. They may,
for example, provide that only written evidence be considered by
the arbitrators, or that the statute of limitations shall or shall not
be followed by the arbitrators; or they may include more general
§57.02 (1951).
55See Part III infra.
56For examples of the use of such a provision see Treadway v. Terrell, 117
Fla. 838, 158 So. 512 (1935); Ogden v. Baile, 73 Fla. 1103, 75 So. 794 (1917). The
provision of the statute of 1828, which the present §57.02 replaced in 1892, read:
"when any submission is intended to be made a rule of court . . .an agreement
to that effect ... shall be filed ...
57See Part IV infra.
58STURGES, op. cit. supra note 52, §218; see Part IV, 5 infra.
54FLA. STAT.

59See Paxt IV, 4 infra.
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requirements, such as one that a specified standard set of rules for
the conduct of arbitrations be followed, 60 or even that the arbitrators
must apply all applicable rules of substantive law.
4. Formal Requirements
A statutory submission agreement must be in writin i 61 and must
be signed by each party to the agreement. 62 This requirement as to
63
signing has been strictly construed by the Florida Supreme Court.
64
There are no such requirements for a common law agreement.
III. MAKING THE STATUTORY ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
A RULE OF COURT

A common law agreement to arbitrate is not made a rule of court,
or ordinarily made a matter of public record in any other fashion;
it remains a private agreement of the parties unless it becomes necessary to invoke the aid of a court in enforcing an award rendered pursuant to it.
A statutory submission agreement must be made a rule of court.65
60E.g., the "Commercial Arbitration Rules" of the American Arbitration Ass'n,
which is located at 9 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20, N.Y.
GFLA. STAT. §57.02 (1951), Coxetter v. Huertas, 14 Fla. 270 (1873); see STURGES,
op. cit. supra note 58, §72.
02FrA. STAT.
63

§57.02 (1951).

O'Bryan v. Reed, 2 Fla. 448 (1849), one party to an arbitration under the
Florida statute failed to sign the agreement. The award rendered after an investigation in which both parties apparently participated was held unenforceable, even
though the party against whom the award was rendered signed it.
1n

6ICPANDALL,

PRACrICE IN

ACTIONS AT LAW IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS AND SUPREMsE

COURT OF FLORIDA §240 (a) (1928); STURGES, op. cit. supra note 52, §59. See also
note 45 supra.
65The statute is not explicit as to the time the agreement must be made a rule
of court, but it strongly implies that this must be done before the arbitrators
begin their consideration of the controversy. FLA. STAT. §57.02 (1951) describes
the procedure for making an agreement a rule of court and concludes, ". . . and
thereupon the arbitrator or arbitrators and umpire shall have the powers hereinafter specified." In Payne v. McElya, 90 Fla. 900, 901, 107 So. 241, 242 (1925), the
Court said, ". . . the record does not affirmatively show that the statement therein
required was recorded in the minutes of the court, . . . which is a prerequisite to
vesting any power in the arbitrators." In view of the strictness with which the
Florida Court has dealt with other provisions for making an agreement a rule of
court, cautious practice would certainly require that it be made a rule of court
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An arbitration agreement is, in the words of the statute, ".. . made a

rule of court by the parties [sic] filing in the court which would have
jurisdiction of the controversy if it were not submitted to arbitration,
a statement... of the agreement .... "6 The statute further provides
that "[t]he clerk of the court

..

shall record said statement in the

minutes of the court, and thereupon the arbitrator or arbitrators and
umpire shall have the powers hereinafter specified."67 No order of
the court is needed to make the agreement a rule of court; it becomes
a rule, or order, of the court by operation of the statute, upon the recording by the clerk. It has been held under this provision that both
the filing and the recording of the agreement are "jurisdictional"
requirements, and that the record must affirmatively show such filing
and recording in order that there be an enforceable statutory award.58
IV. THE

ARBrrRATION PROCEEDING

1. Power to Subpoena Witnesses

The Florida arbitration statute authorizes arbitrators to subpoena
witnesses for statutory arbitration hearings in the same manner as
witnesses are subpoenaed by the circuit courts of the state.6 1 There is
no power to subpoena witnesses for a common law arbitration hearing
in Florida. 70
before the arbitrators begin their consideration. Cf. Readdy v. Tampa Elec. Co., 51
Fla. 289, 41 So. 535 (1906); O'Bryan v. Reed, 2 Fla. 448 (1849).
66FLA. STAT. §57.02 (1951).
67Ibid.

6sPayne v. McElya, supra note 65; Readdy v. Tampa Elec. Co., supra note 65.
69FLA. STAT. §57.03 (1951) states: ".. .the said arbitrators or either of them shall
be and they are hereby authorized and empowered to issue subpoenas to compel the
attendance of witnesses under the same regulations as the clerks of the circuit
courts of this state, which said subpoenas shall be served by the sheriff or any
constable of the county, and shall be obeyed by the witnesses in the same manner
as subpoenas issued from any court within this state."
70It is dear that the power given arbitrators to subpoena witnesses by FLA.
STAT. §57.03 (1951) is confined to statutory arbitrations. The section confers
power on "the said arbitrators," that is, those appointed by the agreement made a
rule of court under §57.02. The latter section reads: ".... and thereupon [making
the agreement a rule of court] the arbitrator or arbitrators and umpire shall
have the powers hereinafter spedfied." No common law power to subpoena witnesses for an arbitration exists, Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Gulf Breeze Cottages, 38
So.2d 828 (Fla. 1949);

STURGES,

op. cit. supra note 52, §153.
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2. Necessity for Swearing Arbitrators and Witnesses
With regard to the swearing of arbitrators, the Florida statute provides:71
"The arbitrator or arbitrators, and umpire appointed as
aforesaid, shall, before entering upon the investigation of the
matter submitted to them, be severally sworn before some
judge or justice of the peace faithfully and diligently to execute
the trust committed by the submission .... "
The arbitrators in a common law arbitration in Florida need not be
sworn unless the arbitration agreement requires the swearing. 72
71FLA. STAT. §57.03 (1951). It was under this provision that Cassara v. Wofford,
55 So.2d 102 (Fla. 1951), and Ogden v. Baile, 73 Fla. 1103, 75 So. 794 (1917),
held it "mandatory" that the arbitrators be sworn, but that any objection to failure
to swear them is waived unless made before the award is rendered.
In the Ogden case the Court stated that the objection to lack of an arbitrator's
oath was waived because not made before the award was rendered, and also that
such objection could not be raised on a motion to set aside an award inasmuch
as it is not included among the grounds for vacating awards in FLA. STAT. §57.07
(1951). As to the unsoundness of the latter proposition, see pp. 190-193 infra.
In the Cassara case objection to the failure to have the arbitrators sworn was
made prior to entry of the award; the Court said, at p. 105: "The law is well
settled that arbitrators exercise judicial functions; and, while not eo nomine
judges, they are in fact judicial officers. 'It therefore becomes of the utmost importance that in statutory proceedings of this character, where the rights of
parties are adjudicated, not by trained lawyers and judges, but by fellow business
men, every safeguard possible should be thrown about the proceeding to insure
the utmost fairness and impartiality of those charged with the determination of
the rights of the parties.' . . . The legislative direction as to the oath is, in its
terms, mandatory; and, as stated in Inslee v. Flagg, 26 N.J.L. 368, 69 Am. Dec.
580, 'The Legislature doubtless designed to give to every party who submitted his
controversy to arbitration the protection which the law affords to every party
litigant, viz. the oath of the tribunal by which his rights are to be adjudicated.' ...
"We think, then, that an objection, if timely made, to the arbitrators' hearing
and determining a controversy without first being sworn, would be sufficient reason
for invalidating an award subsequently made by such arbitrators. An objection
made for the first time after an award has been entered would not be a sufficient
reason for setting aside the award. See Ogden v. Baile . . .Whether or not the
objection was timely made in the instant case, we do not decide, since the judgment appealed from must be reversed for other reasons." In subsequent proceedings
a more complete disclosure of the facts revealed that the parties in submitting
the disputed matter had agreed to a determination before unsworn arbitrators, and
the award was therefore upheld, Cassara v. Wofford, 62 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1953).
72FLA. STAT. §57.03 (1951) refers only to arbitrators "appointed as aforesaid,"
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As to the swearing of witnesses, the statute provides that "... the
examination of all witnesses before the said arbitrator or arbitrators
or umpire shall be under oath, and if the parties themselves be examined such examination shall also be under oath ... ... Witnesses
at a common law arbitration hearing in Florida need not be sworn
74
unless the agreement so requires.
3. The Right to a Hearing
Notice and Opportunity to Be Heard. In any arbitration, either
common law or statutory, each party must be given an opportunity to
be heard by the arbitrators. 75 Reasonable notice of the time and place
that is, by the agreement which is made a rule of court, and therefore does not
apply to common law arbitrators. There is no common law requirement that arbitrators be sworn, Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Gulf Breezes Cottages, 38 So.2d 828 (Fla.
1949); STuRcES, op. cit. supra note 52, §208. Note, however, that the reasons given
for the desirability of the arbitrators' oath in a statutory arbitration in Cassara v.
Wofford, supra note 71, are equally applicable to a common law arbitration. Appraisers need not be sworn, Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 28 Fla. 209, 10 So.
297 (1891).
3
7 FLA. STAT. §57.03 (1951). The effect of the failure to swear a witness under
this provision has not been decided. See, however, effect of failure to swear an
arbitrator, supra note 72. As to the proper person to administer the oath, see
CRANDALL,

op. cit supra note 64, §242.

74FLA. STAT. §57.03 (1951) requires only that witnesses before "the said arbitrators" shall be sworn, that is, arbitrators appointed by the agreement made a
rule of court. There is no common law requirement that the witnesses be sworn,
STRGEs,

op. cit. supra note 52, §215.

75Citizens Bldg. of West Palm Beach v. Western Union Tel. Co., 120 F.2d 982
(5th Cir. 1941); Cassara v. Wofford, 55 So.2d 102, 106 (1951): ". . .an arbitration
proceeding, even though informal in nature, is nonetheless a judicial, or quasi-judicial, procedure; and it is universally held that in arbitration proceedings, as in
all judicial proceedings, persons whose rights and obligations are affected thereby
have an absolute right to be heard and to present their evidence, after reasonable
notice of the time and place of the hearing; and that failure of the arbitrators to
give notice and an opportunity to be heard is such misconduct or misbehavior as
will vitiate an award, irrespective of the fact that there may have been no corrupt
intention on the part of the arbitrators." See STURGES, op. cit. supra note 52, §152.
The effect of the failure to accord a party the right to a hearing is, as the above
opinion states, to vitiate the award. Of similar effect, it seems, is the failure to
accord a party any of the aspects of the right of hearing dealt with in la through
e infra. See Cassara v. Wofford, supra, as to effect of absence of a party at the introduction of testimony on the award. In Ogden v. Baile, supra note 71, the
Court advanced the proposition that the taking of the testimony of one party
during the absence of the other and the taking of testimony during the absence
of an arbitrator were not errors which would vitiate an award. But the statement

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1953

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1953], Art. 1
ARBITRATION
of the hearing must be given each party in order that he may avail
himself of the right.76 Appraisals are distinguished from true arbitrations in this respect;7 7 and it has been held in Florida that, at
least in certain types of appraisals, there is no right to a hearing.78
But of course the appraisal agreement may provide that the parties
be given this right.
Right to Have All the Arbitrators Present. It is an established
rule for any arbitration, common law or statutory, that the parties
have the right to a hearing before all of the appointed arbitrators,
and this even though a majority may be able to decide the awardas is the case of the Florida statutory award.79 The Florida Supreme
Court has recognized this rule as the common law doctrine and has
held it applicable to statutory arbitrations as well.s o
Right to Be Present at Interrogations and Investigations. The
general rule for both common law and statutory arbitrations is that
a party has not only the right to notice of the hearing but also the
right to be present at all times when the arbitrators conduct investigations of the matters in dispute and at the interrogation of the witnesses and the adverse party."' The Florida statute stating that the
is dictum, as both objections were expressly waived or abandoned. As to the
general unsoundness of this proposition see pp. 185-187 infra.
In subsequent proceedings a more complete disclosure of the facts revealed that
the parties in submitting the disputed matter had agreed to a determination without a hearing, and the award was therefore upheld, Cassara v. Wofford, 62 So.2d

56 (Fla. 1953).
70Cassara v. Wofford, quoted in note 75 supra; STURGES, op. cit. supra note 52,

§152.
VJc supra.
7,Citizens Bldg. of West Palm Beach v. Western Union Tel. Co., supra note 75;
Cassara v. Wofford, supra note 75; Florida Yacht Club v. Renfroe, quoted in note
77See

6 supra.
79STURGMu, op. cit. infra note 83. The rule is, however, subject to some qualifications, ibid. As to umpires, see note 49 supra.
sOCassara v. Wofford, 55 So.2d 102 (Fla. 1951); Ogden v. Baile, 73 Fla. 1103,
75 So. 794 (1917). But see comment as to the latter opinion at pp. 185-187 infra.

The Court has held that the "exclusion of one of the arbitrators from the
hearings would be such 'misbehavior' as to justify setting aside the award signed
by the other arbitrators," Cassara v. Wofford, supra at 105. But the Court has said
that the withdrawal of an arbitrator "does not, per se, invalidate the award," and
that a party may be estopped to object to the withdrawal, id. at 105. For subsequent
proceedings in this case see note 75 supra.
SIn Cassara v. Wofford, supra note 80 at 106, the Court quoted with approval
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parties shall be examined "in the presence of each other"'s is merely
declaratory as to a portion of the rule.
Right to Have All MaterialEvidence Heard; to Cross-Examination.
The right to a hearing entitles a party to make a full presentation
of his case, and the arbitrators may not refuse to hear any material
evidence offered. Arbitrators are not bound by rules of evidence and
may therefore admit any evidence they see fit; but, since they may not
refuse to hear a party, the rejection of material evidence is ground
83
for setting aside an award.
As a part of his right to be heard, a party may cross-examine the
witnesses heard by the arbitrators.8 '
Waiver. The parties may expressly agree to waive their right to
a hearing, in toto or as to any of the particular aspects dealt with
above.8 5 The conduct of a party may also constitute a waiver of the
right to a hearing or a particular aspect of the right.'8
4. Requirement of Fairness
There are certain requirements of a valid award which impose
important fundamental duties on the arbitrators. These are usually
stated in the negative, as grounds for resisting an award, and will be
the following language: "'While arbitrators are not required to proceed with the
formalities of a court, they must proceed in such a manner as to give a full hearing
to each of the parties, not only upon the several items of the claim presented by

himself, but also upon the claim of his adversary, and upon the evidence adduced
in support of that claim. This they cannot do without hearing a party and his
witness in the presence of the opposing party. Unless this right is waived by the
party, either in the agreement of submission or by conduct amounting to a waiver,
an award made under such circumstances is clearly void."' See Ogden v. Baile,
supra note 80. But see comment as to this opinion at pp. 185-187 infra; STuRGES, op.
cit. infra note 83, §217. The rule is, however, subject to some qualifications and
exceptions, id. §§217, 219.
82FLA. STAT. §57.03 (1951).
83

STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBIrRATIONS AND AwARDs

§214 (1930).

841bid.

851d. §§205, 207, 214; see Cassara v. Wofford, supra note 80.
8S6His conduct may waive objection to the failure to allow him to hear the
testimony of his opponent's witnesses, according to dictum in Cassara v. Wofford,
supra note 80 at 105. If after due notice he fails to attend an arbitration hearing,

he cannot object to an award on the mere ground that he was absent, ibid; STURGEs,
op. cit. supra note 83, §207. If he participates in an arbitration hearing at which
the full number of arbitrators is not present, without objecting to the absence
of the arbitrators, he waives the right to object, id. §205.
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dealt with in greater detail in the section of this article dealing with
such grounds.87 It can be stated generally that arbitrators must not
be guilty of fraud, corruption, gross negligence, misbehavior, or certain
kinds of mistakes.
5. Adherence to Rules of Law
Other than as bound by the basic requirements for the conduct
of the hearing which are set out above, as modified or extended by
agreement of the parties, the arbitrators are free to conduct the arbitration proceeding as they see fit. They are not bound by the ordinary
rules of evidence or the rules for the conduct of judicial proceedings. 88
Nor are the arbitrators bound, unless the parties have provided otherwise by agreement, to adhere to substantive rules of law which would in
a court of law be applied to the controversy.8 9 They may apply any
law they see fit, or no law; they are, it has been said, "a law unto
themselves."90 "They are . . . free to apply any rules or principles
which in their conscience or judgment are most likely to produce a
just and equitable award." 9'
V. THE AWARD
No particular form or language is necessary for the award, common
law or statutory. As stated by the Alabama Supreme Court, "the
simple announcement of the result of their investigation" is all that
is required of the arbitrators. 92 The award must, however, be sufficiently certain to apprise the parties what is expected of them, or, if
necessary, to provide the basis for a judgment or decree9 3
1. Number of Arbitrators Who Must Concur
All the arbitrators must concur in a common law award unless
SSee Part VIII infra.
8sSTuRns, COMMERmL ARarrATioNs AND AwARDs §214 (1930).
soCassara v. Wofford, supra note 80; Treadway v. Terrell, 117 Fla. 838, 158 So.

512 (1935); STuRGEs, op. dt. supra note 88, §218. CRANDALL, op. cit. supra note 64,
§242, states, "(The arbitrators] are judges of both the law and the facts ...
9OKing v. Falls of Neuse Mfg. Co., 79 N.C. 360, 362 (1878).
9

1KELLOR, ARBITRATION iN

92

Acrion

98 (1941).

Brewer v. Bain, 60 Ala. 153, 161 (1877).

3

0 STURGES, CoMMERCIAL ARBrRATiONS AND AwARDs
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the arbitration agreement provides otherwise; 94 but the concurrence
of a majority is sufficient for an award under the Florida statute.9 5
2. Requirement that Award Be Coextensive with Submission
Both common law and statutory awards are governed by the following principles. The arbitrators' authority is limited to that given
them by the agreement of the parties, and therefore an attempted
award on matters outside its scope is of no effect.9" On the other hand,
it is an established principle that an award incomplete in that it
does not determine all matters submitted by the agreement is fatally
defectiveY But awards are liberally construed as encompassing all
the matters submitted; and it will be presumed that the parties brought
all matters within the scope of the submission agreement to the
attention of the arbitrators and that all matters brought to their
attention were decided by the arbitrators. 9
3. Requirement that Award State Adjudication in Full
The statute states that an award "shall state the adjudication in
full." 99 The significance of this requirement is not clear. 100 It is
submitted that a statement of the ultimate obligation determined is
all that is necessary. No fuller statement should be necessary than
will be required in the judgment or decree entered on it. The "fullness" required of the award is, it would seem, merely the certainty
and completeness of statement necessary to make clear what is expected of the parties, which requirement applies equally to a common law award.' 0 '
94d. §231.
STAT. §57.05 (1951). As to "umpire" see note 49 supra.
96Cassara v. Wofford, 55 So.2d 102 (Fla. 1951). As to partial validity of an
award see CRANDALL, op. cit. supra note 64, §243; STURGES, op. cit. supra. note 93,
§226.
97Ogden v. Baile, 73 Fla. 1103, 75 So. 794 (1917); O'Bryan v. Reed, 2 Fla. 448
(1849); Blood v. Shine, 2 Fla. 127 (1848); STURGES, op. cit. supra note 93, §225.
9SBlood v. Shine, supra note 97; CRANDALL, op. cit. supra note 64, §243; STURGES,
Op. cit. supra note 93, §225.
99FLA. STAT. §57.05 (1951).
lo0No Florida case has dealt with the matter, and the provision is not commonly
found in arbitration statutes of other jurisdictions.
'olSee Part V supra. It would further seem that the provision does not require
an itemization of claims or specifications of matters determined, and that no
statement of findings of facts or reasons for the decision is required.
05FLA.
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4. Formal Requirements
A common law award need not be in writing unless required by
0 2
the agreement of the parties or an applicable Statute of Frauds.
The Florida statutory award, however, must be in writing and must
03
be signed by a majority of the arbitrators.
5. Filing and Recording Statutory Award
In order to be enforceable in a court, by either of the methods
giscussed below, a statutory award must be filed and recorded in the
10 4
manner set out below. A common law award is not filed or recorded.
VI. ENFORCING THE AwARD

1. Converting the Award into a Judgment or Decree
Ordinarily the parties will voluntarily comply with an award.
When, however, the losing party refuses to comply because he believes
the award is invalid, or for,.any other reason, the prevailing party
may proceed with enforcement. The procedure for enforcing statutory
awards is markedly simpler than that for common law awards.
Statutory Award. The statute provides that the award "shall be
10 5
filed and recorded in the court of which the arbitration is a rule,
and that so much of the award as decrees the payment of money
"shall have the force and effect of a judgment from the day of entering
said award."'10 Provision is also made for an award relating to the
102 CRANDALL, op. cit. supra note 64, §243; STuRGEs, op. cit. supra note 93, §223.
303FLA. STAT. §57.05 (1951).

1o4See Part III supra.
105FLA. STAT. §57.05 (1951).
106FLA. STAT. §57.09 (1951). Cf. O'Bryan v. Reed, 2 Fla. 448, 459 (1849), in
which, after arbitrators had made an award, motion that the submission and
award be made a rule of court under the statute and judgment and execution be
had was denied, without discussion as to the propriety of the motion. The motion
was denied because the submission had not been signed as required by the statute
and for other reasons. The arbitration statute in effect at the time provided for
the filing of the submission agreement which was to be made a rule of court and
stated that thereupon "the clerk shall enter said rule." It would not seem that
such a motion would be necessary or proper under the present statute, §57.02,
which provides that an arbitration is made a rule of court "by the parties filing
...a statement ... of the agreement." As to the time for making an arbitration
agreement a rule of court, see Part III supra.
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performance of other acts.1 0 7 The statute further provides that notice
of entry of the award shall be given to the persons against whom it is

rendered, 08 and allows them thirty days after such notice within which
to move to set the award aside. o9 It is therefore dear that the award
is not to be enforced until the expiration of this thirty-day period or
the determination of the motion to set the award aside. The Florida
Supreme Court has held that both the award and the notice of the

entry of the award must be filed and entered of record, and that unless
the record shows that both are recorded the award cannot become a
judgment." 0
The statute further provides that, as to that part of the award

which directs the payment of money, "execution may be issued as in
cases of judgment duly entered"; and that so far as the award relates
to the performance of any other lawful act "the party failing to comply
with said award shall be considered in contempt, and by the order of
court shall be committed to prison, there to remain without bail until

he shall comply with the order of the court in the premises.""'
Common Law Award. To enforce a common law award it is necessary to file suit on the award, in an appropriate law or equity action,

and thereby procure a judgment or decree corresponding to the terms
§57.09 (1951).
(1951) provides: "And the clerk of such court (or the
court, if it have no clerk) shall give notice of the entry of the award ......
109FLA. STAT. §57.06 (1951).
1imn Payne v. McElya, 90 Fla. 900, 902, 107 So. 241, 242 (1925), the Court,
dismissing a writ of error taken to an order of the circuit court denying a motion
to set aside a statutory award, said: "The record does not affirmatively show, however, that the statement [of the arbitration agreement], the award, or notice of
entry of the award were entered of record as the law requires, all of which are
necessary prerequisites to jurisdiction and to confer power on the arbitrators and
to make the award or the money part of it a final judgment. .. It appears that
these instruments were duly filed, but this showing is not at all conclusive that
they were 'entered of record,' and until so entered of record execution cannot be
entered against the money part of the award, nor does it become a final judgment
to which writ of error may be taken." See also Readdy v. Tampa Elec. Co., 51 Fla.
289, 41 So. 535 (1906).
It should be noted that, although the statute does require that the award be
made a matter of record, there is no such statutory requirement as regards the
notice of the award, and that the holding that the notice must be made a matter
of record was not necessary to the decision in the Payne case.
" FLA. STAT. §57.09 (1951). As to enforcement of a statutory award by common
law procedure, see SruRrcs, op. cit. supra note 93, §3.
107FLA. STAT.

10SFLA. STAT. §57.05
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of the award. 1 2 The common law award is enforceable only to the
extent to which a judgment or decree in a traditional law or equity
action can secure the performance of the act required by the award.
The law or equity action will be governed by the rules ordinarily ap3
plicable to such actions. It will require the filing of a complaint2"
and the service of process and will allow the defendant, by motion or
answer, to assert grounds"14 for avoiding the award. Ordinary pretrial and trial procedures will be followed, including the determination
of fact questions by a jury if one be requested in an appropriate
case. The judgment or decree entered will be enforced as in an
ordinary action. Although in some instances a full-length suit will
be necessary, if defendant defaults or answers but asserts no substantial
ground to avoid the award and thus makes summary judgment possible,

222Enforcement by a law action: Johnson v. Wells, 72 Fla. 290, 73 So. 188 (1916);
Wilcox v. Stephenson, S0 Fla. 377, 11 So. 659 (1892); see STuRGES, op. cit. supra
note 93, §§290, 292.
That an equity court will grant specific performance of an award under appropriate circumstances is firmly established by decisions in other jurisdictions,
STuRGEs, op. cit. supra note 93, §303; and, although no Florida case granting specific
performance of an award has been discovered, the doctrine should apply in Florida
also. In International Realty Associates v. McAdoo, 87 Fla. 1, 99 So. 117 (1924),
plaintiff filed suit in equity to cancel the provision of a contract which called for
arbitration of questions as to its interpretation. The Supreme Court stated, at p.
10: ".. . there is no law or rule by which courts of equity are required to enforce
awards resulting from arbitration ...." In the context of the opinion the meaning
of this statement is not clear. It seems likely that the Court meant that the law
does not require equity courts to enforce arbitration agreements. Even if the
statement is taken literally, it is wholly unnecessary to the decision. There was no
attempt here to enforce an award. No award has been made or even attempted to
be made under the agreement. And the Court stated that the existing difference
between the parties did not come within the arbitration provision of the contract,
so no award could have been made. Cf. Florida Yacht Club v. Renfroe, 67 Fla. 154,
64 So. 742 (1914), allowing specific performance of a contract to convey lands at
a price fixed by appraisers. CRANDALL, op. cit. supra note 64, §245, states: "It [a
common law award] may be enforced by an action at law on the award or in equity
if there is no adequate remedy at law. Specific performance is the usual relief
equity offers in such cases."
ll3The suit will be based on the arbitration agreement and the award entered
pursuant thereto; and the complaint must, except when the action is on the common
counts, allege such basis for the suit, STURGES, op. cit. supra note 64, §293. As to the
necessity of alleging and proving compliance with the essentials of the arbitration
procedure and special requirements of the agreement, see STURGEs, id. §§294, 295.
ll4See Part VIII infra.
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enforcement of the award can be had with much the same rapidity as
in the case of the statutory award.
2. Setting the Award up as a Bar
When an action is brought on the subject matter of an arbitration
award, common law or statutory, in disregard of the award, the action
may be defended by asserting the award as a bar. If the award is one
rendered in a statutory arbitration, it must be filed and recorded in
the manner set out above under "Converting the Award into a
Judgment or Decree" 115 in order to be a valid bar to the action. The
award will be asserted by ordinary defensive procedure, usually by
answer, possibly by motion; and its validity will be determined by
16
trial or hearing thereon.
VII. PROCEDURE FOR RESISTING THE AWARD

1. In an Action Seeking to Convert the Award into a
Judgment or Decree
Statutory Award. A statutory award may be resisted by moving
the court in which the submission is a rule, and in which the award
has been entered, to set the award aside." 7 Details of the practice
on this motion are set out in the statute." 8 The statute provides that
at the hearing on the motion "no parol testimony shall be admitted
on either side," 1 9 and so restricts the court to written evidentiary
materials.
"15See Part VI, 1 supra.
ll6Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 28 Fla. 209, 10 So. 297 (1891); Howard v.
Pensacola & A.R.R., 24 Fla. 560, 5 So. 356 (1888); Finegan v. L'Engle, 8 Fla. 413
(1859); STuRcEs, op. cit. supra note 93, §305.
"17RA. STAT. §57.06 (1951); see Part VIII infra.
The arbitrators have no authority to grant a motion to set aside their award,
Ogden v. Baile, 75 Fla. 1103, 75 So. 794 (1917).
" 8 FLA. STAT. §57.06 (1951): The motion must be filed within 30 days of the
notice of the entry of the award, which notice is required to be given the parties
against whom the award is rendered. The motion must specify grounds on which
the award is resisted. The moving party must give the opposing party, or his attorney, 10 days' notice of the hearing on the motion.
"19FLA. STAT. §57.08 (1951). This section further provides: "The court . . .
shall require affidavit of the facts constituting the ground on which the motion
is made, and shall also, if offered, receive affidavit on the other side."
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Common Law Award. A common law award may be resisted by
interposing an appropriate defense, by way of motion or answer, in
the law or equity action brought on the award. 120 The validity of the
defense so posed will be determined in accordance with the usual
procedures of the law or equity court. 121
2. In an Action Setting the Award up as a Bar
When a party to an award maintains that it is invalid, he may be
in a position to bring an ordinary law or equity action on the subject
matter of tie award; and in such case when the award is set up as a
bar to his action he may attack the award.122 The award may be either
common law or statutory. The procedure for such attack will be that
of an ordinary action in which defensive matter is attacked by plaintiff.
3. By an Independent ProceedingBrought to Vacate
or Revise the Award
An early Florida case held that an injunction could not be granted
to restrain the entry of a judgment on a common law award because
the plaintiff could raise any defense to the award in the proceeding
to enforce the award, and that plaintiff could not "by anticipating legal
proceedings address the equitable jurisdiction of the court to enjoin
the entry of a judgment."'123 But in one later case the revision of a
common law award by an equity decree was approved, 1 24 and in
12oSTrURGEs,

op. cit. supra note 93, §361; see Part VIII infra.

365 (1930).
221Howard v. Pensacola & A.R.R., supra note 116; STuRGES, op. cit. supra note

121See

STUREs, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AwARDs §§364,

121, §361.
2Coxetter v. Huertas, 14 Fla. 270, 271 (1873). The injunction sought in this
case was, it should be noted, not to set aside or vacate the common law award but
to restrain the entry of a judgment on the common law award; and the Court
stressed that because the award was not a statutory one the injunction would not
lie. The case does not, therefore, squarely hold that an injunction to set aside a
common law, or statutory, award will not lie, although the reason advanced for
denying the injunction here applies to such situations as well as that decided.
Florida practice allows the defendant in an action at law to assert equitable
defenses, FL.A. STAT. §52.20 (1951); FLA. C.L. RuiE 9 (g).
124Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Gulf Breeze Cottages, 38 So.2d 828 (Fla. 1949). The
Supreme Court affirmed an equity decree which revised a common law award
settling the amount of storm damage to insured buildings. The equity court had
reversed the award because it found that the arbitrators' method of computation
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another the Court stated that an injunction may be used to set aside
and annul a statutory award.125 It therefore seems likely that as an
alternative to resisting the enforcement of an award, common law or
statutory, a party may in an appropriate case institute a separate
equity suit to set the award aside, and also that in a proper case the
equity court may revise the award.1 26 The equity suit may prove a
valuable alternative to the motion to set aside the statutory award in
situations in which the time limit for making the motion cannot be
met and when the objecting party prefers the live testimony of the
equity hearing to the written testimony prescribed for the hearing on
the motion.'?7
of the damage was erroneous. The Court did not discuss the propriety of the
equity action or the power of the Court to reform the award. For further discussion of this case, particularly as to the power to review an error of the arbitrators, see pp. 190-193 infra.
'1sjohnson v. Wells, 72 Fla. 290, 301, 73 So. 188, 192 (1916). In this suit in
equity for an accounting and to set aside and enjoin the enforcement of a statutory
award which had determined that defendant was due $328 from plaintiff in a
partnership dissolution the circuit court reversed and determined that plaintiff
was owed $2,479 by defendant. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment for
plaintiff and dismissed the suit on a finding that there was not the "slightest proof
of the essential allegations of [plaintiff's] bill." But in its opinion the Court
posed the question whether the statutory award could be set aside and annulled
by a court of equity on the ground of fraud of a party. This question is answered
in the affirmative in approving the trial court's order overruling defendant's demurrer to the bill alleging the fraud. The fraud was not that of an arbitrator,
which is specified in the statute as a ground for a motion to set aside a statutory
award, but was that of a party. It may be argued that the attack here was under
the statute and therefore could have been made by motion to set the award aside.

This argument may be made by taking the position that any condition which
vitiates the award-such as fraud of a party-may be shown by motion to set
the award aside. Taking this view, the case is authority for the proposition that
an equity suit may be used as an alternative to objection by statutory motion. If,
however, the position taken is that the attack is not based on the statute but is
instead an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the equity court to give relief
for fraud, the case is not authority for the proposition. The Court did not indicate
which of these positions it was taking.
126See STURGES, op. cit. supra note 121, §§361, 364, 365. CRANDALL, op. cit. supra
note 64, §246, states as to common law awards: "To assert some of the grounds of
impeachment, the defendant was forced, originally, into chancery where he asked
to have the action restrained. This he may still do." And as to statutory awards:
".. . this statutory remedy [the motion to set aside the award] has not taken
from the chancery court its former jurisdiction .... "
127To the extent that a party may assert as a defense to a statutory award an
equity defense which cannot be made by motion to set the award aside, the suit

in equity will be his exclusive remedy. As to such defenses see pp. 185-187 infra.
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VIII. GROUNDS FOR RESISTING THE AWARD

Failure to satisfy any of the requirements of common law or
statutory arbitration procedure, discussed above under the headings
"The Agreement to Arbitrate," "Making the Statutory Agreement a
Rule of Court," "The Arbitration Proceeding," and "The Award,"
will constitute ground to set the award aside if the requirement is
essential to the validity of the award, unless the objection thereto
has been waived. 128

No attempt is made here to state which of the

foregoing requirements are essential, or which may be waived, or
what constitutes waiver.129 In dealing with arbitration procedure
under the above headings the effect of failure to satisfy a particular
requirement of the procedure has been set forth in the attached notes
whenever possible1 3°
In Ogden v. Baile, decided in 1917,131 the Florida Supreme Court
held that the failure to comply with various procedural requirements
relating to the agreement, the hearing, and the award, some of them
clearly essential to the existence of the award,13 2 could not in a statul2aSimilarly, requirements under the heading "Enforcing the Award," Part VI
supra, will have to be met in any enforcement proceeding.
12The following generalizations were made in Readdy v. Tampa Elec. Co., 51
Fla. 289, 296, 41 So. 535, 537 (1906), a statutory arbitration case: "It seems to be
established law, when parties resort to the statutory mode of arbitration, as distinguished from the common law modes, that the requirements of the statute shall
be substantially complied with; some courts holding that they must be strictly
adhered to.
". .. There are cases holding that immaterial defects in the statutory proceedings before arbitrators may be waived by the parties, but we have discovered
no case which holds that matters which are in their nature jurisdictional can be
waived. If such a case could be found it would seem to be out of harmony with
the weight of authority and with reason."
In Blood v. Shine, 2 Fla. 127, 133 (1848), a common law arbitration case, the
Court said it fully agreed with the following language: "'If the parties are suffered
to lie by, and after the award is made to avail themselves of these technical objections, you utterly destroy this admiral [sic] domestic forum."'
1230E.g., the signature of both parties to a statutory arbitration agreement is
essential and is nonwaivable, O'Bryan v. Reed, 2 Fla. 448 (1849); the oath of
statutory arbitrators is mandatory, but objection thereto is waived unless made
before the award, note 71 supra; objection to the failure to allow a party to hear
the testimony of his opponent's witnesses may be waived, note 86 supra; recording
of the statutory award is essential to its enforceability, and even though duly
made and filed it is ineffectual unless recorded, note 110 supra.
13173 Fla. 1103, 75 So. 794 (1917).
1 2Among the defendant's grounds of objection to the award were the following:
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tory arbitration be asserted as grounds of attack on the award. The
discussion of this holding in the appended note demonstrates, it is
submitted, that the holding is based on an interpretation of the statute
that is dearly erroneous. 133 Most of the opinion is dictum; and other
Florida decisions hold that almost all of the grounds advanced in
this case may be asserted in attacking a statutory award, two of these
contrary decisions having been made after the Ogden case. 3 4 The
Ogden holding should, therefore, be considered as null in toto.':
In addition to the attack on procedural grounds, there may be an
(1) The agreement to arbitrate was not properly signed by the parties; (2) testimony of Baile was taken while Ogden was absent; (3) testimony was taken while one
of the arbitrators was absent; (4) the arbitration agreement was not properly
recorded; (5) the arbitrators were not sworn; (6) the arbitrators were not properly
appointed; (7) the arbitration was not made a rule of court; (8) all matters involved in the submission were not considered by the arbitrators.
I33The
Court said that the award could not be set aside because none of the
defendant's grounds of attack were included in the list of grounds contained in
the statute. The statute provides that "[a]n award of any arbitration duly appointed, made pursuant to the said submission, shall be set aside . . . only on the
ground of fraud, corruption, gross negligence or misbehavior . . . or of evident
mistake .... " FLA. STAT. §57.07 (1951). The statute thus recognizes that the
arbitrators must have been duly appointed; the award must be pursuant to the
submission; and there must be an award. If these conditions are met, attack can
be made only on the listed grounds. It certainly does not prohibit a showing that
the alleged award does not in fact exist, because there was no valid arbitration
agreement, no appointment of arbitrators, no concurrence of the necessary number
of arbitrators, or for any other reason which goes to the essence of its existence.
134Ground (1) in note 132 supra was successfully asserted against a statutory
award in O'Bryan v. Reed, 2 Fla. 448 (1849); grounds (2) and (3) were held to
be "misbehavior" which will set aside a statutory award in Cassara v. Wofford, 55
So.2d 102 (Fla. 1951), 62 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1953); ground (4) was held fatal to a statutory award in Payne v. McElya, 90 Fla. 900, 107 So. 241 (1925), and in Readdy v.
Tampa Elec. Co., supranote 129. The Court in the Cassara case agrees with Ogden v.
Baile that ground (5) cannot be asserted after the award but bases its holding on the
ground that this objection is waived if not made before award, or possibly at some
earlier time, rather than on the ground that it is not included in the statutory list;
no other case has been discovered on ground (6); ground (7) was held fatal to a statutory award in Payne v. McElya, supra, and in Readdy v. Tampa Elec. Co., supra;
ground (8) was held fatal to the statutory award in O'Bryan v. Reed, supra;see Blood
v. Shine, 2 Fla. 127 (1848). See also Johnson v. Wells, discussed in notes 125 supra
and 139 infra.
'35It should be noted that, while the mere fact that a ground for objection to
an award is not found in the statutory list does not under his view of the Ogden
case prevent its assertion, all provisions of statutory arbitration procedure are not
so essential to the validity of the award that their noncompliance will cause the
award to be a nullity, and that even if essential to its validity certain of them
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attack on the award for failure of the arbitrators or parties to abide
by certain standards of fairness and proper conduct in determining
the award, that is, a limited attack on the decision-making process.
It is important to notice preliminarily that under conventional law,
applicable to common law as well as to statutory arbitration, 136 this
attack is by no means a complete review of the determination made
by the arbitrators and cannot be made merely because facts were
erroneously determined by the arbitrators, or because a different result would have come about had the arbitrator applied a rule of law
which would have been applied had the controversy been tried by a
court.137 The arbitrators in the usual, unrestricted arbitration are em-

powered to determine facts as they see fit and to apply or disregard
rules of law as they see fit,13s within the limits of the minimum requirements of fairness set out immediately below.
Regarding the conclusiveness of awards the Florida Supreme Court
has stated: 139

"The reason for the high degree of conclusiveness which attaches to an award made by arbitrators is that the parties have
by agreement substituted a tribunal of their own choosing for
the one provided and established by law ....To permit the dissatisfied party to set aside the award and invoke the judgment
of the court upon the merits of the cause would be to destroy
the purpose of the arbitration and render it merely a step in
the settlement of the controversy instead of a final determination
of it."
40
Similar pronouncements have been made by the Court in other cases.1

may be waived. See Part IV, 5 supra.
130But see Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Gulf Breeze Cottages, at p. 830, discussed at
pp. 190-193 infra.
137STURCES, COMMERCIAL ARBrrRATIONS AND

AWARDS

§366 (1930); see note 136

supra.
"38 See Part IV, 5 supra.
139Johnson v. Wells, 72 Fla. 290, 297, 73 So. 188, 190 (1916). This was a
statutory arbitration. In this same case the Court also stated at p. 301, 73 So. at 192:
".. the award... remains binding between the parties and of course is not to be
set aside, even though a court of chancery upon hearing the evidence might have
arrived at a different conclusion from that expressed by the arbitrators."
' 4OIn Ogden v. Baile, 73 Fla. 1103, 1110, 75 So. 795, 797 (1917), the Court said
that it would "never undertake to substitute . . . [its] judgment for that of the
arbitrators." This was a statutory arbitration.
In Cassara v. Wofford, 55 So.2d 102, 105 (Fla. 1951), the following statement
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The grounds on which a statutory award, otherwise valid, may
be attacked are, as stated by the statute:1 41 ". . . fraud, corruption,
gross negligence or misbehavior of one or more arbitrators or umpire
who may have signed the award, or... evident mistake acknowledged
by the arbitrators or umpire."' 14 2 And the Florida Supreme Court has
held that a traditional equity ground for relief against the award may
be asserted, even though it is not within the terms of the statute, as,
for example, when a party rather than an arbitrator has acted to procure an award fraudulently.143 Essentially these same terms are used to
describe the grounds for setting aside an otherwise valid common law
award. 44 Variants of these terms may be found describing the common
was made: "Thus, the award of arbitrators in statutory arbitration proceedings
cannot be set aside for mere errors of judgment either as to the law or as to the
facts; if the award is within the scope of the submission, and the arbitrators are
not guilty of the acts of misconduct set forth in the statute, the award operates as
a final and conclusive judgment, and-however disappointing it may be-the
parties must abide by it. As stated in Johnson v. Korm, Tex. Civ. App., 117 S.W.2d
514, 519, citing Payne v. Metz, 14 Tex. 56: 'The Court should interpose in this
class of cases with great caution; and never, except in a case of urgent necessity, to
prevent the consummation of a fraud, or some great and manifest wrong and injustice. It is not every error or mistake of law or fact, which will warrant the
setting aside of an award. If it were, there would be but few awards made which
would stand the test of judicial investigation; for they are most frequently made
by men not learned in the law, nor skilled in judicial proceedings. And if they
could be questioned on slight grounds for trivial errors, there would be few which
would not become the subjects of judicial investigation; for the cases will be
rare indeed, in which the award however equitable and just, will prove perfectly
satisfactory to all parties.'"
See also the quotation from Wilcox v. Stephenson, infra note 155. But see Glens
Falls Ins. Co. v. Gulf Breeze Cottages, at p. 830, discussed at pp. 190-193 infra.
14In Johnson v. Wells, supra note 139, it was alleged that one party had
sworn falsely before the arbitrators and produced as evidence a book of accounts
containing false and fraudulent entries. The Court held that fraud sufficient to
set aside the award was alleged, distinguishing this case from those in which the
general rule, that a judgment will not be set aside because it is founded on perjured or fraudulent evidence, has been applied.
142These specified grounds constitute the standard of fairness by which the
arbitration must be conducted; see Part IV, 4 supra.
143The Court did not reconcile its holding that fraud of a party will vitiate a
statutory award with the provision that an award otherwise valid may be set aside
"only on the ground of fraud ... of one or more of the arbitrators." It bases its
authority to set the award aside on the general equity power to give relief for fraud.
If reconciliation with the statute is needed, it can be pointed out that no valid
award can be said to exist if procured by fraud; and hence the exclusive grounds
for attack on the award never come into play.
144See STtORGEs, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AwARDs §§366-368 (1930).
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law grounds, 45 but the terms used to describe the grounds for attack on
both statutory and common law awards are general and are so vague
that it cannot be said that one group differs materially from the
other, 14 6 except as to the relatively insignificant qualifications stated
47
in the statute.1
This article does not undertake the difficult and probably unrewarding task of analyzing these grounds upon which an award may
be attacked, and will merely set out a few miscellaneous general statements with regard to them. Florida cases dealing with the grounds are
set out in the notes. 48 The terms obviously overlap to a great extent.
l45The following terms are found in the common law cases in the Florida reports: "partiality," "obvious mistake," "fraud" (all dicta), Finegan v. L'Engle, 8
Fla. 413, 424, 423 (1859); "fraudulent conduct or practice," "concealment, deception or other improper conduct," Howard v. Pensacola & A.R.R., 24 Fla. 560,
590, 591, 5 So. 356, 370 (1889); "fraud or such gross mistake as would necessarily
imply bad faith or a failure to exercise an honest judgment (dictum), Howard v.
Pensacola & A.R.R., id. at 599, 5 So. at 374; "fraud or collusion," "such gross misapprehension or mistake as would amount to fraud," Wilcox v. Stephenson, 30 Fla.
377, 389, 11 So. 659, 662 (1892); see STuRGES, op. cit. supra note 144 §§366-368.
l4OContra: CRANDALL, op. cit. supra note 64, §246: "Where action or suit is
brought upon such . . . [common law] award, it may be impeached by the defendant and the grounds available for such impeachment are more extensive than
those which will support a motion to vacate a statutory award. In these cases
inquiry may be made into the conduct of the arbitrators and of the parties and
if it appear that the arbitrators have been parties and unjust or have mistaken
the law, a judgment or decree will not be rendered upon the award." In attacking
statutory awards inquiry may be made into the conduct of the arbitrators, FLA. STAT.
§57.07 (1951), and the parties, Johnson v. Wells, supra note 139. "Unjust" conduct
might well constitute the "misbehavior" which vitiates a statutory award. "Mistake,"
either as to fact or law, is ground for attack on a statutory award in a proper case,
FLA. STAT. §57.07 (1951); see note 152 infra. The fact that an arbitrator is a
party would not seem to cause the avoidance of a common law award any more
readily than it would a statutory award. The Crandall commentary antedates
Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Gulf Breeze Cottages,discussed at pp. 190-193 infra, and there
is no indication that by this statement he intended to embrace the unorthodox doctrine of that case.
147The statute speaks only of misbehavior of an arbitrator who signs the award.
It has been held that in a situation in which a common law award could be
rendered by a majority of the arbitrators the misbehavior of any arbitrator is
sufficient to vacate the award, STuRGEs, op. cit. supra note 144, §§366, 367. The
statute requires that mistake be evident and acknowledged by the arbitrators,
whereas a common law award may be avoided for mistake though not acknowledged
by the arbitrators, STURm, id. §366. Also the statutory "gross negligence" may
be an extension of the common law grounds.
24sSee notes 141, 145 supra, 149-153 infra.
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"Fraud" includes not only actual but "technical" fraud.149 Fraud may
be shown by an award that is so excessive or inadequate as to shock
the conscience of the court. 5 0 An act may constitute "misbehavior"
even though no corrupt intent is present. '1 1 "Mistake" is severely
circumscribed in meaning and does not include errors of judgment
152
on the part of the arbitrators.
The Florida Supreme Court in Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Gulf Breeze
Cottages,'53 decided in 1949, departed sharply from the generally accepted law as to the grounds of attack on common law awards, which
is set out above. The Court held that an award determining the payment due under an insurance policy for storm damage to buildings
could be revised by the court because the arbitrators had erroneously
applied rules concerning depreciation in calculating the amount of
damage and the value of the buildings. The erroneous application
of a rule of law is not, of course, a ground on which the court is permitted to revise an arbitration award, either common law or statutory,
under orthodox doctrine. 5 4 The Court held in this decision, however,
that under Florida law a common law award may be attacked on
grounds other than the conventional ones of fraud, corruption, misbehavior, and the like, and that the ground of attack asserted in this
149STURGES,

op. cit. supra note 144, §367; see note 145 supra.

50STuRcES, op. cit. supra note 144, §368; see note 145 supra.

15'Cassara v. Wofford, 55 So.2d 102 (Fla. 1951), 62 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1953).
'152Mr. Justice Grier, speaking for the United States Supreme Court in Burchell
v. Marsh, 17 How. 344 (U.S. 1855), warned: "Courts should be careful to avoid
a wrong use of the word 'mistake,' and, by making it synonymous with mere error
of judgment, assume to themselves an arbitrary power over awards." A mistake, as
the term is here used, exists, says Dean Sturges, op. cit. supra note 144, §366, "If
arbitrators assume a material matter in their investigation and award to be a certain
way, and later this assumption is established to have been incorrect . . . .. A
clear example of such mistake is when arbitrators rely on false weights or measures.
Nor will the failure to apply a rule of law which would be applied in a court of
law constitute a mistake unless the arbitrators intend to decide in accordance
with a rule of law and make a mistake as to what that rule is, STURGES, id. §366.
As to that type of mistake that will avoid an award, the Florida Court has stated
in Johnson v. Wells, 72 Fla. 290, 301, 73 So. 188, 192 (1916): "The mistake of the
arbitrators referred to in the pleadings is not such a mistake as would vitiate the
award. Their mistake appears to have consisted in their opinion of erroneous conclusions of fact. The award was their deliberate conclusion reached by their reason
and judgment on the facts before them, and although they may upon reconsidering
the same evidence or new evidence come to a different conclusion from that expressed in their award, it could not be avoided upon that ground."
15338 So.2d 828 (Fla. 1949). The case is discussed in note 156 infra.
'15 4See Part IV, 5 supra.
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case was within those permitted by Florida law. The stated basis for
this holding, which is analyzed in the appended note,' 1 5 is, it is submitted, unsound and the decision is unwarranted. It will, if its full
implications are given effect, severely limit the usefulness of common
1G5In this case a disagreement having developed between the parties as to the
amount due plaintiff under insurance policies providing for reimbursement by
defendant for losses to plaintiff's buildings from storm damage, three persons were
appointed to determine the amount of reimbursement due. In addition to determining the amount of damage, it was necessary to determine the "sound value"
of the buildings. An award was rendered and plaintiff sued in equity for a revision of the award. The trial court found that the figure set for the sound value
of the buildings was erroneous in that it was based on the replacement cost of
the buildings without allowing for depreciation, and redetermined the valuation
by deducting depreciation. In addition it found that the determination of the
damage amount was erroneous in that depreciation had been deducted from the
cost of the repairs, the court holding that depreciation should not have been
allowed on the materials used for repair. The Supreme Court affirmed these rulings
of the trial court, rejecting defendant's argument that the award could be set aside
only on the grounds of §57.07 of the arbitration statute.
Although the Court's holding that §57.07 does not apply to common law arbitrations is clearly correct, the grounds for setting aside common law awards are,
by firmly established conventional doctrine, approximately the same as those
available for attacking a Florida statutory award, which are set out in §57.07, and
would not permit the assertion of the objection raised by defendants. The
Florida Court had in earlier cases recognized the conventional limits on the
grounds for attacking a common law award. In Wilcox v. Stephenson, 30
Fla. 377, 11 So. 659 (1892), the Court held that an architect's common law award,
or "certificate," made pursuant to an agreement of the parties that he should
determine whether a building had been constructed according to specifications,
was binding and refused to admit testimony attacking it. The Court said at p.
389, 11 So. at 662: ".... when the architect, under its [the agreement's] provisions,
certifies that the work or any stipulated portion of it has been done to his satisfaction, and in compliance with the contract, such certificate as to the work included therein is conclusive upon the owner, unless he can avoid it by showing
fraud or collusion in its procurement, or such gross misapprehension or mistake
as would amount to fraud to permit it to prevail. . .. There is no provision in
the contract that reserves to the defendant the right to go behind or to open up
or question these . . . estimates . . . . [S]uch certificate was tantamount to an

adjudication or final settlement between the parties that everything back of it
and included within it was free from defects or objections .... To have permitted
this architect . . . to go behind his own . . . certificate . . . without any wrong

doing on the part of plaintiff, or any gross mistake in the procurement thereof
. . . would have been an ignorement of the mutual obligations resting upon the
parties respectively."
In Johnson v. Wells, 72 Fla. 290, 296, 73 So. 188, 190 (1916), the Court said by
way of dictum: "The settling of disputes and controversies by arbitration was
recognized at common law. . . . The courts regarded the matters submitted as
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law arbitration, as any party dissatisfied with an award will be able
to have a court redetermine the matter decided by the arbitrators in
order to determine if the arbitration properly applied rules of law.
As the Supreme Court itself so clearly pointed out in its earlier opinion
quoted above, the purpose of arbitration would thus be destroyed.1 6
It is not possible to define with any accuracy the area, beyond the
bounds of the conventional attack on common law awards, within
which the decision of the Glens Falls case is to be applied, assuming
concluded by the award, and in an action thereon would not review the merits
of the arbitrators' findings." See also the pronouncements of the Court as to the
reasons for the conclusiveness of statutory awards, which would seem to apply
equally to common law awards. See p. 187 supra; notes 139, 140. The opinion in
the instant case does not mention the common law doctrine or the earlier Florida
holdings, nor does it appear from the opinion that appellant's counsel sought
to have the Court apply them; and the Court does not seem to recognize that it
is departing from the established law.
The Court reached its conclusion that grounds for overruling common law
awards are more extensive than those for overruling statutory awards from the
fact that the statutory procedure is in some respects more formal than common
law procedure and is "supervised" by the court, holding that because of these
circumstances common law grounds for attacking the award are more extensive.
The additional formalities mentioned by the Court are the recording of the
agreement, oath of the arbitrators, and power to subpoena witnesses. By "supervision" of the statutory arbitration the Court must mean the power to compel
witnesses to testify as in an ordinary suit and the power to force the arbitration
to proceed by contempt citation; no other intervention by the judge could be had
until after the award is made, when a motion to set it aside could be addressed
to the court. The Court might also have mentioned that the statutory procedure
for enforcing the award, by motion and hearing on written evidence, is less formal
than the common law method of suit on the award. The basic difficulty with this

holding is the seeming failure of the Court to recognize the existence of the welldeveloped common law rules for setting aside an award. But even if it be assumed
that the Court's decision was a considered one and took into consideration the common law rules, its reasoning is questionable. The statute does not by its terms
affect common law grounds for attacking an award. Its only reference to common
law arbitration is a recognition of its continued existence. But by this reasoning

the statute changes the common law grounds by implication. Such reasoning behind the proposition decided by this case is, it seems, this: When the legislature

set up a new statutory arbitration system to exist alongside the existing common
law system, and provided essentially the same grounds for attacking an award in
the new system as had existed in the old, making the new system more formal in
its procedure for arriving at the award and less formal for attacking the award,
the new system by implication made more extensive the grounds for attack on an
award in the old system. It is submitted that this proposition is unsound and that
no such implication should be read into the statute.
256See pp. 185, 186 supra.
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that the decision is followed. The scope of review allowed by the
decision and the situations in which this review is to be allowed are
wholly uncertain. The opinion merely says that "the relief which is
asked in this case" against the award is to be allowed "in a case like
this." Possibly this extension of the grounds of attack is to be confined to cases arising out of facts similar to the Glens Falls case, that
is, the determination of amounts of loss and of valuation257
It is to be hoped that the Glens Falls rule will be repudiated, or,
if not, that it will be strictly confined. But at present the case must be
recognized as casting considerable doubt on the conclusiveness of all
common law awards in Florida. It should be noted that, as the
opinion makes clear, this holding in no wise affects the conclusiveness
of statutory awards.

As stated at the outset, this article does not purport to appraise the
substantive worth of arbitration as a method of settling disputes. The
practitioner familiar with its workings, its shortcomings, and its advantages will be able to determine when it can best serve the needs of
his client. The worth of arbitration has been demonstrated over a
long period of time in many jurisdictions. It does not replace litigation. It will not in most situations be the most desirable method for
the determination of disputes. It is, however, another valuable tool
for arriving at a satisfactory conclusion in the event of dispute, one
that frequently can provide the most advantageous method for the
conclusion of the dispute.
The possibilities of arbitration in Florida have not been utilized to
their full extent, largely because of ignorance of the existing procedure
and because present Florida law restricts the area and effectiveness
of its application. It is hoped that Florida will in the near future bring
its law abreast that of other states in this field, a process which can
be readily accomplished by passage of a carefully drafted statute, and
that with such reform, and an increased awareness of arbitration on
the part of the bar, it may come into its full usefulness.
'S7The case involves, it seems, an "appraisal" rather than a true arbitration.
See V{c supra. There was here no necessity for the Court to determine under which
class the case falls, and it did not do so. Ordinarily the conclusiveness of awards
in true arbitrations and appraisals is not materially different, if at all, but it is
possible that they may at times be distinguished for this purpose; and the rule
of this case might be confined to appraisals if not more strictly confined. See
S-ruRGs, op. cit. supra note 144, §§8-12.
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